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ABSTRACT

The study of education is such an important undertaking it should be a regular part of the curriculum for all students, not just those preparing to be teachers. An ideal syllabus would comprise four main areas of education, interconnected with aspects of four disciplines. The areas would be: education's relation to the culture and subcultures; educational control and administration; curriculum theory; and teaching and learning. The disciplines would be history, philosophy, anthropology, and literature, together with selected information from the human sciences. The first unit would focus on history, in order to supply the background for the topics of units to follow. The second unit would include educational aspects of such topics as acculturation, cultural change, and ethnicity, all treated largely within cultural anthropology. The third unit, drawing mostly on philosophy, would provide the skills needed to analyze concepts and arguments, and would be concerned with aims, values, and the constituents of knowledge. The final unit would center on human development, treating theories of human nature as they bear on education, and drawing principally on philosophy, literature, and psychology. (JD)

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THE PROPER STUDY OF EDUCATION*

George F. Kneller

My topic tonight is the proper study of education or what makes education an academic discipline. I shall have little to say about the process or the profession of education, about schooling or pedagogy. My purpose is to illuminate our common endeavor and justify its place along with other disciplines in the university curriculum, especially at the undergraduate level. My text is taken from Alfred North Whitehead: "We are only just now realizing that Education requires a genius and study of its own." Much that I say will not be new to you, but I believe that my message is especially timely today, and I hope it will encourage you to make our study the discipline it ought to be.

First, let me propose three definitions. By a *discipline* I mean an intellectual enterprise with a domain of phenomena, a body of data, concepts, and theories, and a set of techniques for gaining, validating, and applying knowledge. Neither the domain nor the techniques need be unique. Psychology and sociology alike study human beings, often in the same way, and economics possesses few techniques, and no general method, of its own. By *education conceived as a discipline*, I mean a field of study embodying the knowledge we use to structure and guide intellectual, moral, and emotional development. By a *theory of education*, I refer to a set of mutually consistent or coherent propositions derived logically or plausibly from assumptions about the proper nature and purpose of education. A theory of curriculum, for example, is a set of propositions about the kind of curriculum appropriate to the sort of education assumed to be desirable.

Why should we be concerned to establish education as a discipline? There are many reasons. First, to raise the standing of education as a study in the academic world, where, due largely to variable scholarship, it still is underappreciated. Second, to remind other disciplines of the educational importance of what they research and teach. Third, to remind educationists that their intellectual endeavor is as valuable as any other and conceivably the most useful of all intellectual endeavors. Fourth, to stress the importance of studying aspects of education that are not the central concern of other disciplines—aspects such as curriculum, instruction, control, and administration. Fifth, to clarify the changes in meaning that occur when concepts are imported into education from other disciplines...concepts such as "learning" from psychology, or "socialization" from sociology, or "production" and "consumption" from economics. Finally, to counter, or help to counter, public disillusion with schools of education and teachers and administrators generally. I realize that much of this disillusion is part of a general distrust of all public services, but much of it also originates in the uncertain status of educational studies.

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Some people doubt, and others deny, that education can be an autonomous discipline. They do not see how the subject matter of education can be unified, since so much of it comes from other disciplines with different aims, content and research methods. My reply is that all disciplines relevant to education are more alike than different, and it is the likenesses that count. Furthermore, no discipline is wholly autonomous. Psychology and sociology come together in social psychology; there also are psychohistory, psycholinguistics, and physiological psychology. Physics expands into biophysics, astrophysics, geophysics, and physical chemistry. A discipline is unified and autonomous to the extent that it can give direction to its subdisciplines while receiving information from them. Education not only takes from other disciplines; it gives to them. It will become more disciplined to the extent that it influences research and teaching in other disciplines through the knowledge it alone provides.

Critics also contend that the study of education is undisciplined because its subject matter is not organized hierarchically by means of theories and concepts indigenous to education. These critics assume that a discipline of education must model itself on mathematics and the natural sciences. But not even the human sciences, still less the humanities, possess anything like this degree of logical structure. Take the study of English, which encompasses an impressive array of subdivisions, including language, literature, composition, stylistics, and, very often, speech and communication. Does anyone doubt that English is a discipline? Yet its subject matter, like that of education, is loosely structured with no laws and very few theories that all its practitioners accept.

In recent years courses in education increasingly have been moved to the graduate or professional level, and for several reasons: (1) Many faculty members in other fields have raised doubts about the academic qualifications of education as a substantive discipline. (2) The heavy emphasis on practical pedagogy, characteristic of these courses, was not regarded as suitable to the undergraduate experience. And (3) education courses were taken almost exclusively by students intending to become teachers; they failed to appeal to undergraduates generally. It is a sad commentary on our profession, and on our subject matter, that we have been unable to include in the undergraduate curriculum the study of education as a substantive discipline and therefore have failed to interest the rank and file of students in a subject that is as important to them as any they take. Too many educationists have agreed with other faculty that, unlike standard subjects, education cannot profitably be studied by undergraduates generally. Too many members of our profession seem to have agreed with other faculty in the mistaken notion that education and pedagogy are synonymous. It is almost like saying that physiology and medicine or economics and management are one and the same.

The movement of education courses into graduate schools has left a vacuum that should be filled forthwith, if only for the fact that, unlike other professional studies, education increasingly has been ignoring the disciplines that are basic to it. Medicine draws on biology and chemistry; law, on ethics and politics; engineering, on mathematics; management, on economics. What disciplines are most basic to the study of education? They are the humanities: history, philosophy, literature, and certain aspects of cultural anthropology. These disciplines are most basic because education at heart is a normative, not a scientific, enterprise. It is concerned not just with the acquisition of

knowledge and skills, but also with principles of right action according to cultural norms.

True, many people speak of a "science" of education. If by this they mean empirical studies undertaken to determine what they think are the most effective ways to teach, design curricula, and administer schools, they may be using the term correctly. But if they mean the study of educational phenomena as if they were natural phenomena, the term is misused. Just think what a naturalistic science of education would be like. It would attempt to formulate laws and theories explaining, predicting, and controlling the educational process, not only in this country, but throughout the world. It would provide data that were precise, value free, and applicable everywhere. Yet can you imagine a time when all of us, let alone all the people of the world, will agree precisely on what education should be and do? Granted, natural scientists disagree among themselves, and the behavior of subatomic particles seems much like the behavior of human beings. They don't sit still long enough to be measured; their behavior so far is not entirely predictable; and every time you think you have nailed things down well enough to establish a law of subatomic behavior, the phenomena enter again into a new cosmic universe, and experimentation is renewed. Among natural scientists, however, most disagreements eventually are resolved by experimenting with phenomena that can be controlled and measured, whereas empirical evidence never will resolve the debate between those who believe in school prayer or school vouchers and those who do not. Their disagreement is not about scientific fact but about norms and values. Since, as I have said, education intrinsically is a normative endeavor, in that it seeks to realize ideals, and since ideals are matters of personal and social choice, education always will be subject to disagreement and controversy, and therefore never reducible to a naturalistic science.

What shall we say of the human sciences, especially psychology and sociology? After a hundred years of imitating the natural sciences, what can the human sciences offer to education? Not long ago, on the TV show "Firing Line," William F. Buckley gave Wilson Riles a list of 5 prime factors in any educational encounter: (1) skill of the teacher; (2) parental influence; (3) student intelligence and attitude; (4) learning environment; (5) student socio-economic environment. Buckley asked Riles to rate these factors on a 100-point scale according to their relative importance as determined by scientific research. Riles hesitated and asked for the question to be repeated. It was. After thinking for a moment, Riles said he could not rate the factors quantitatively. Why not? We do not have the evidence, he replied. And he was right. We do not. Think of it! After spending hundreds of millions to measure educational priorities, we still have no real answers. And we never shall. Quantitative research never will answer Buckley's question or the really pressing questions of education.

Despite prodigious efforts, human scientists have produced no universal laws or theories that are either scientific or precise. Instead, psychology and sociology offer only tendency statements, temporary generalizations, and ideosyncratic taxonomies, the fiduciary basis of which is both weak and elusive. Psychologist Lee Cronbach agrees with me. In the once fashionable field of aptitude-treatment interactions, Cronbach said he spent 18 years seeking stable interactions between instructional treatments and student characteristics. Finally, he told the American Psychological Association, "Once we attend to interactions, we enter a hall of mirrors that extends to

infinity." Any interactions Cronbach said he had identified soon changed along with changes in the social environment. Does it any longer make sense to look for laws? No, says Cronbach. "Taking stock today, I think most of us judge theoretical progress to have been disappointing. Many of us are uneasy with the intellectual style of psychology." He therefore proposed a more modest goal, to "seek insights into social relations and pin down the contemporary facts" in each generation. Instead of laws, then, we have insights; instead of theories, data. Now we educationists always can use data, provided we bear in mind the perspectives from which they were gathered. But if we want insights, I think I can show you better sources than either psychology or sociology.

Most people in education realize that the human sciences have failed to deliver on their promises. What bothers me is that these people seem untroubled by the relentless grip psychology exerts on educational thought and practice. Throughout the country legislators, swayed in part by educationists, make educational psychology a requirement for teaching licenses; they ignore history, philosophy, and other humanities. They seem convinced that for prospective teachers, the only source of reliable knowledge about human behavior, or the mind, or teaching and learning, is educational psychology. How long must we endure this charade? I recently glanced through some university catalogs and found that courses in educational psychology outnumbered all courses in history, philosophy, comparative education, and foundations put together. There isn't enough substantive knowledge in educational psychology to justify this disproportion, and what knowledge there is often can be found in more suitable form in the humanities. Psychology no doubt has yielded some useful information; but some theories, such as those of interest, readiness, transfer of training, social promotion, developmentalism, and discovery learning, may have done more harm to education than good, not only because the research supporting them was ill-conceived and poorly executed, but also because the theories themselves were not directly applicable or relevant to classroom teaching and learning. Psychology and sociology are of value to education only if the educationist first adopts a theory of education and then finds a school of psychology or sociology compatible with the theory. If you begin with psychology or sociology, as many do today, and read off what you think are their implications for education, you are lost.

Cultural anthropology is another story. It is the most fruitful of the human sciences for the study of education because it is an interpretative and descriptive science *par excellence*. Why do I say this? First, anthropologists use the method of participant observation. They look into the minds of those they study and seek to comprehend their view of the world. Their aim is to understand people, not to predict their behavior, much less to control it. Next, anthropologists explore education cross-culturally, both within nations and among them. In comparative education especially they investigate the aims, methods, and institutions of education as cultural emanations. Third, anthropologists examine education in its entirety, studying not only schooling, but also education by parents, peers, media, and other agencies, as well as both formal and informal learning. Fourth, and of special importance in this country, anthropologists give us valuable information about race and ethnicity. In our richly multicultural society educators and educationists must come to grips intellectually with an extraordinary array of cultural ideas, practices, and products.

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Finally, anthropology acts to correct psychological generalizations about, for instance, the alleged universal character of the development of the human mind as advanced by such as Piaget and Kohlberg with their sequential stages. The growth of the mind is seen by anthropologists as dependent to a large degree on particular cultural habits, demands, and language use acquired in early life. Critical factors in development of mind, therefore, cannot be universalized by applying the standards of a single culture, race, or socio-economic group, or even of Western civilization, much less by standards acceptable within the domain of psychological experimentation generally, but by the special situation of particular subjects in time, place and circumstance. I do not say that psychologists are unaware of the necessary impact of cultural environments and symbolic representations, as Howard Gardner's FRAME OF MIND testifies; but if psychology is to be of greater use to education, especially in a multicultural society, it must be supplemented by anthropology. Because, in my view, cultural anthropology is a human science of greater scope and meaning for education than either psychology or sociology, I would recommend, if I were an administrator and my budget were frozen, that offerings be decreased in psychology and increased in anthropology.

Any scholar wishing to understand his discipline must study its history. I have no time to discuss how different historians have interpreted the past, much as these interpretations recently have reached the front pages of our news media. Instead, I will make just two points. A knowledge of educational history will reveal that although styles change, along with ways of doing things, new and challenging discoveries of substance are likely to occur only infrequently. In education the lifespan of most innovations has been short, thus leading to Kneller's Law: "The more highly innovative the institution, the shorter the life of the innovations within it." We must bear in mind that any educational reform springs from tradition. The so-called "frontiers" of knowledge, the "breakthroughs" and "cutting edges" that we so often cite, always have a hinterland of preconceptions by which we determine, through critical experience over time, what has proved valuable and what has not. If history does nothing else, it provides us with that critical experience. My second point has to do with the present decline of interest in history *per se*, which may be due in part to its unfortunate dilution into social studies—unfortunate because the product is scraps of information too often lacking perspective or structure and resulting in a sacrifice of narrative form, continuity, and chronological development that characterizes history as an autonomous discipline. Seen from the perspective of education, which deals intimately with human reality and aspirations, history is a humanity, not a social study, and certainly not an empirical social science. After examining all kinds of research over many years, I am convinced that historical evidence is more relevant to the study of education than evidence from psychology or sociology. Again, however, this evidence is useful only if interpreted in the light of an educational theory, together with a compatible theory of history.

In both cases this theoretical understanding comes mainly from philosophy, which examines the foundations of all disciplines. There is philosophy of science, philosophy of religion, philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of psychology (very much needed), and, of course, philosophy of education. In all cases philosophy clarifies the concepts and assumptions these disciplines often take for granted. In the case of

psychology, for example, philosophy considers what the mind is, what an action consists of, and how thought and action are to be understood. Particular schools of psychology, and there are a dozen of them, assume they have the answers to these questions, and they press ahead with their research. But since, as philosophers have shown, the questions have not been answered, research findings often conflict and are confused. The classic debate between Rogers and Skinner shows how two psychologists argued from empirical evidence to entirely different conclusions, so that the debate came to turn on philosophical assumptions about what psychologists should be doing. In any research, whether educational or otherwise, the questions and hypotheses must be clearly conceptualized or the conclusions will be ambiguous and of no theoretical or practical use. In fact, they well may damage education and the life of knowledge generally. Philosophy acts to correct educational research by ascertaining, for example, how far a classification scheme is logically coherent, whether a generalization is empirically informative or tautological, and what form an educational theory should take. I know that some educationists tend to dismiss philosophy as impractical and elitist, but if philosophy did nothing more, its contribution to educational research alone would be testimony to its practicality.

Perhaps even more practical, and less elitist, is philosophy's relevance to test validation. I will cite a concrete example. In wide use today is a test for critical thinking composed by two eminent psychologists. It fails of its purpose, for neither the tasks nor the test results differ significantly from tests for general intelligence or examinations normally given to high school students to measure their assimilation of course content. Worse, the authors do not seem to know the difference between the truth or falsity of propositions as against the validity or invalidity of inferences. Thus in one exercise the test taker is told, "Examine each inference...and make a decision as to its degree of truth or falsity"—as if truth and falsity came in degrees as a result of logical inference. Again, the test fails to make the crucial distinction between questions that are self-contained and questions that require the use of information not in the questions themselves. Thus in one section the test taker is asked to judge whether each of a series of arguments is strong or weak. The questions are said to be self-contained, for the directions state, "Judge each argument separately on its own merit; try not to let your personal attitude...influence your evaluation." Yet both questions and arguments answering them are political and social. One question asks, "Should the US government take over all the main industries in the country, employ all who want to work, and offer the products at cost price?" The so-called "merits" of these arguments clearly depend on one's political views. Arguments that appear strong to a conservative will appear weak to a liberal and vice versa. In response, my own gratuitous recommendation would be that the test taker,faced with any such test, attack the questions rather than try to answer them, and thus more truly reveal a capacity for critical thinking. Now I am not saying that test validation is something only a study of philosophy can provide, but simply that a study of philosophy can be of considerable help, because its very substance is conducive to performing the task. May I add that since the whole business of educational testing has become the undeserved monopoly of psychologists, they should study more philosophy, or alternatively, make way for people in the humanities to take over what now intellectually is a faltering and not very productive enterprise.

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A third contribution of philosophy lies in the development of educational theories, for without theory you cannot justify practice. A philosophic theory may be prescriptive, outlining an ideal form of education. It also may be analytic or critical, enabling us to evaluate educational policies and outcomes. In generating theories philosophy has been fecund. Recently, for example, philosophy has given us a theory of education seen as initiation into worthwhile activities, a theory of curriculum based on clearly defined forms of knowledge, and a theory of the behavior of the educational system. A philosophic theory can be concrete and specific. In an article in the *Journal of Education* , Winter, 1983, Paolo Freire has given us a theory of the act of reading. He asks and seeks to answer: What goes on in a child's world during an act of reading? As an instance of philosophic phenomenology applied directly to an educational problem, you will find nothing more incisive or relevant. Again, if I were an administrator and my budget were frozen, and psychology courses outnumbered humanities courses, I would take from psychology courses and give to philosophy, thus making both the discipline and the practice of education more authentic and reflective.

Under any consideration I still would make room for courses in literature and education. The neglect of literature by educationists is incomprehensible. Like the historian, the philosopher, and others in humane studies, the creative writer gives us knowledge of how to live. The writer embodies knowledge of human beings and education in a tale that moves our imagination and emotions as well as our intellect. Writers make us see and feel what it is like to educate and be educated in different times and places. Charles Dickens, for example, portrays 20-odd schools and refers to several more. He also depicts a dozen types of coercion in child-training. In *Women in Love*, D.H. Lawrence, a former elementary school teacher, gives us a riveting portrayal of a lesson seen by a school inspector. Especially since World War II education has become the central theme and setting of many novels. For portraits of teaching, learning, classroom interactions, and the joys and miseries of childhood and adolescence, we can do no better than study such works as Muriel Spark's *The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie*, John Horne Brown's *Lucifer with a Match*, Frances Patton's *Good Morning, Miss Dove*, Herman Wouk's *Marjorie Morningstar*, and many others I could name.

Literature extends our knowledge of education by enabling us to participate vicariously in other educational experiences than our own. Literature does this partly because it is itself the representation of experience and partly because it is expressed so vitally that it leads the reader to identify with the character or characters having the experience. Take this insightful passage from D. H. Lawrence's *The Rainbow* about young Ursula Brangwen as a student in an English School:

> So Ursula seated herself upon the hill of learning, looking down on the smoke and confusion and the manufacturing, engrossed activity of the town. She was happy. Up here, in school, she fancied the air was finer, beyond the factory smoke. She wanted to learn Latin and French and mathematics.... A Latin verb was virgin soil to her.... And when she knew that $x^2 - y^2$ equals $(x + y)(x - y)$, she felt she had grasped something, that she was liberated into an intoxicating air, rare and unconditional. And she was very glad as she wrote her French exercise: "J'ai donné le pain à mon petit frère." In all these there was a sound of a bugle in her heart, summoning her to perfect places. She never forgot her brown-colored *First French Grammar*, or her *Via Latina* with its red edges, or her little gray algebra book. There was always magic in them.

For us, too, there is magic in them, thanks to Lawrence's sensitive prose.

The opposite phenomenon—what it is like to teach a subject one loves to a class that is not interested—is splendidly captured in Bel Kaufman's *Up the Down Staircase*. The young teacher-narrator is idealistic yet able to laugh at herself. Thus she conveys both the joy and frustration of teaching. Take this passage:

> The trouble is, their utter lack of background. "I never read a book in my life," a boy informed me, "and I ain't starting now." It isn't easy to make them *like* a book.... The important thing is to make them feel King Lear's anguish, not a true-or-false test on Shakespeare.... I want to point the way to something that should forever lure them, when the TV set is broken and the movie is over and the school bell has rung for the last time.

I submit that this expression of a teacher's love of subject and the opposition it can meet is more succinct, more moving, and more true to life than anything written in the usual research paper.

Ezra Pound called writers the "antennae of the race." Often they reveal aspects of education that the educationist has ignored or misconceived. With their imagination, empathy, and verbal skill, writers invariably are more subtle, insightful, and yes, accurate than academic researchers. Evan Hunter's *The Blackboard Jungle*, for instance, tells us more about the causes and phenomenology of school violence than any sociological study I have seen. E. L. Braithwaite's *To Sir With Love* does the same thing for race prejudice. Through his integrity and understanding, a black teacher gradually wins the hearts and minds of his class of hostile white students, who ultimately learn from him as they do from no other teacher. Or take an episode from Irwin Shaw's *Rich Man, Poor Man*. Rudy's French teacher catches him sketching her in the nude. Asked to explain, Rudy replies that he is illustrating a construction he has just learned: "Je suis folle d'amour" (I am madly in love). The teacher, outraged, calls Rudy's father to school. The father stands up for his son. The drawing, he says, does not degrade the teacher but expresses the youth's normal sexuality. Where in the field of scientific research can you find an educational dilemma treated as sensitively as this? If students in education are looking for instant gratification, I would say they will get it by studying educational literature.

I have cited novels. Now let me read a little poetry. For D. H. Lawrence, students are not alone in their spirit of rebellion...against a school, a class, a teacher, or everybody. Here are some unusual but insightful lines on a teacher's rebellion against his students. The verses have a humor all their own.

> What does it matter to me if they can write
> A description of a dog or if they can't
> What is the point? To us both, it's my aunt!
> And yet I'm supposed to care, with all my might
> I do not, and will not; they don't and that's all!
> I shall keep my strength for myself; they can keep theirs as well
> Why should we beat our heads against the wall
> Of each other? I shall sit here and wait for the bell.

What teacher honestly can say he or she never has felt this sense of resignation? And shouldn't our students of education be asked to face up to the moods of surrender and helplessness that teachers so often are compelled to endure?

There are other forms of literature. The drama "The Crisis at Central High," for example, shows how a teacher in Little Rock, Arkansas, becomes embroiled in the 1957 showdown over integration in her high school. Every issue of this racial crisis is

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debated passionately yet realistically, and the teacher herself becomes a model of courage and commitment in the face of mass hostility and resentment. Literature also includes biography and essays. You can reach into Gilbert Highet's *The Immortal Profession*, for example, and there find the inner nature of our mutual enterprise portrayed with such discernment and intuitive power as to cast a shadow on the usual academic attempt. I know that the human sciences are seeking accurate knowledge of education to replace what they regard as the impressionism of the humane studies. But as the decades pass and this goal recedes, it looks more like a mirage. So for knowledge that is reliable, memorable, and absorbing, for knowledge that touches the heart as well as the head, and for knowledge that increasingly should be a fundamental element in the discipline of education, we should turn to literature. If a benefactor were to ask me what chairs to endow for a department of education, I would recommend joint appointments in education and history, education and philosophy, education and cultural anthropology, and education and literature. Just think what such appointments would do for the prestige of education as a discipline or even for teacher education. Psychologists would face competition, for once. And if some, as I hope, went out of business, funds might be provided to retrain them for something more useful.

One benefit that should result from establishing a discipline of education is greater agreement on the essential content of a first or basic course, variously called introduction, foundations, or principles. The kinds of content and methods of teaching this course today are in a sad state of chaos, with results that have done little for the cause of education as a serious and stable disciplinary study. Some teachers treat the course as an orientation to the separate subdivisions and branches of education. Others use the problems or topics approach. In favor of both approaches is the fact that they help the student to choose the phase of education which he or she would like to study further. Against these and similar approaches is the fact that they do little to help the student see education as a whole. They seem to aim at an ever-moving target.

For reasons I have given, I would construct a first course out of content treated both in education and related disciplines. My ideal syllabus would comprise four main areas of education interconnected with aspects of the four disciplines I have mentioned. The areas would be education's relation to the culture and subcultures, educational control and administration, curriculum theory, and teaching and learning. The disciplines again would be history, philosophy, anthropology, and literature, together with selected information from the human sciences. I would start the unit in history to supply the background for the topics to follow, thus eliminating the need for historical data later. My second unit would focus on cultural factors introduced in the first unit. It would include educational aspects of such topics as acculturation, cultural change, and ethnicity, all treated largely within cultural anthropology. My third unit, drawing mostly on philosophy, would provide the skills needed to analyze concepts and arguments and appreciate the task of theory construction. It would be concerned especially with aims, values, and the constituents of knowledge. Units 2 and 3 could be interchanged. Unit 4 would center on human development, on the actions and aspirations of persons involved in education. It would treat theories of human nature as they bear on education, and would draw principally on philosophy, literature, and psychology. Topics would include the nature of intelligence, imagination, and creativity. Especially for students interested in teaching, it would deal with the profession of

education, its rewards and duties, its rights and responsibilities.

The four units would interlock. Literature, for example, would be treated in other units than unit 4. Problems of administration and control would be dealt with throughout the course. I would pay special attention to curriculum theory, which, more than any other area, justifies education's claim to be considered a distinct discipline. Through knowledge in this area, we can demonstrate that education is the prime and arguably the only discipline mainly concerned with what to learn, how to learn, and what it means to have learned something. It also is the only discipline likely to do justice to the vital role of education in social and intellectual life. For example, in her latest work *The Troubled Crusade*, Diane Ravitch gives a superb account of the crucial issues in American education since World War II, including the students' disruption of their own universities, the increased involvement of the courts in education, the fall in intellectual standards, and the ongoing struggle between the view that the prime task of formal education is to transmit a common body of knowledge and values and the view that education is a vehicle for social change. The chances of this remarkable book's ever being studied outside courses in education are slim. Yet it is one of the dozen or so books published in recent years with which students and faculty alike should be familiar, whatever their specialty, since they are all involved in education.

If undergraduates acquired nothing more, they would benefit from at least one course that explained in some depth what the intellectual experiences of their college careers involved. Most undergraduates seem quite ignorant of the many meanings of such terms as thinking, learning, knowing and analyzing. One question frequently asked by even my best students is, What is a concept? What does it mean to conceptualize? Many of you have experienced the incredulity with which even graduate students greet the news that there are half a dozen different ways of knowing and similarly of learning. My students never have failed to be impressed, for example, with Harry Broudy's essay "Mastery." It outlines some nine steps in the process of mastery learning, from mere repetition to the final step of creating new knowledge on the basis of what has been has been learned. This is light years removed from the study of learning in psychology.

I offer my syllabus simply as an illustration of the ideas I have presented this evening. Any syllabus, however, should take into account the reasons I have given for making education a discipline in its own right. It is painfully clear that while we are constrained to draw on other disciplines, we have come to depend on them too much. We have said, for example, that the best educational philosopher, psychologist, historian, sociologist is one who got his or her degree in the related discipline rather than in education. We have hired such people with little or no teaching experience at the pre-college level and slight knowledge of differences between their discipline and education. Yet when did you last hear of other departments appointing an educationist to their staff? We have a serious problem here: specialists in other disciplines are taking jobs away from specialists in education, and we remain complacent. I am a philosopher but I also am a worker and a businessman, and I am concerned about the fate of education both as a discipline and a profession. As such, I propose some sort of collective agreement, to the effect that all future appointments in education of specialists in other disciplines be contingent on a similar number of appointments of educationists in related disciplines. I have no hard data to prove my point, but I would

wager that with this agreement in force, places for over a hundred educationists would become available that now are awarded to interlopers from other disciplines.

Granted, my syllabus embraces a broad range of subject matter, but I see a first course as an overall introduction to the basics of a discipline of education rather than as a selection of topics limited by a particular teacher's academic preparation. To the shame of our profession, many teachers have built their syllabi around their dissertation topic, or special interest, or around material from popular paperbacks dealing mostly with problems of immediate and short-term interest. My syllabus may not appeal to such teachers, but for quality of content and intellectual rigor, it matches any syllabus in the university curriculum.

Again I must stress that the subject matter I propose is not limited to, or even geared toward, the preparation of teachers, any more than courses in sociology are intended to prepare social workers, or courses in English to prepare writers and journalists. The purpose of courses in the discipline of education is to provide knowledge and understanding of education and to challenge students of all specialities to think more deeply and more imaginatively about education as a highly desirable part of their academic experience. There would be an added benefit. Some excellent students not originally planning to be teachers might decide to become candidates, thus broadening the base for selection and consequently raising the quality of our teaching personnel. This broadened base becomes all the more important when we consider that in the next ten years, according to the State Superintendent of Public Instruction, California alone will need 150,000 more teachers.

One final question: Should undergraduates be allowed to major in education? I used to reject the idea on the grounds that majors in education were or would be studying something essentially professional rather than theoretical and academic. But I now am convinced that such a major, organized as a discipline in its own right, is as good an academic major as any, and is eminently suitable for those who lean toward no particular subject. For such students, as well as for others, a major in education would have lasting value, if only because most students become parents interested in the education of their children, all become payers of school taxes, and many vote on educational issues. If those who publicly are concerned with educational matters were to study education formally, in the manner described here, I believe the intellectul level of debate would rise appreciably, and so, presumably, would the standard of schooling.

In my opening statement I said that my message was especially timely today. It is timely because educational reform once again has become the talk of the nation, with all sorts of people getting into the act. I can conceive of no more auspicious occasion for concerted action. Your colleagues now will be more amenable to change, and you should approach them when their resistance is low. I do not claim that my proposal is a panacea, but I hope I have shown that it is at least a step in the right direction—toward the enhancement of education as a mature, responsible, and autonomous university discipline, not in any way less deserving, and in some ways more deserving, than disciplines already in the curriculum.

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